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Byrne: Ricketts v City

SUPREME COURT
NEW YORK COUNTY

Ricketts v. City of New York'
(decided March 18, 1999)
Plaintiff's action sought to "nullify local legislation giving the
City of New York authority to granting franchises for the operation
of commuter van services." In this case, there were four causes of
action. First, the plaintiffs claimed that they were denied due
process guarantees pursuant to the Federal 3 and State4
Constitutions because they were prohibited from using bus routes
and picking up customers without arrangement in advance.5 The
second claim dealt with the many problems with applications for
commuter van services, which the plaintiffs alleged violated their
constitutional rights.6 The third cause of action sought to "nullify
Local Law 115 (1993)." 7 The plaintiffs alleged that this legislation
was not consistent with State law and deprived them of their

181 Misc. 2d 838, 688 N.Y.S.2d 418 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1999).
840, 688 N.Y.S.2d at 420.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in
pertinent part: "No State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law .... " Id.
4 N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 6. This section provides in pertinent part: "No
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law." Id.
5 Ricketts, 181 Misc. 2d at 840, 688 N.Y.S.2d at 420.
6 Id. The plaintiffs alleged "a violation of constitutional rights by allowing
the application for commuter van services to be denied without explanation or
a record for review or merely not responding to the application within 180
days," which deprived the plaintiffs of their right to earn a living. Id.
7 Id. Under the third cause of action, the plaintiffs also argued "that the State
enabling legislation transferring regulatory authority from a mayoral
designated agency is violated by Local Law 115 which gives the final authority
of approval to the City Council, a local legislative body rather than a city
agency." Id. This argument was "nullified by the decision in Giuliani v. The
Council of the City of New York," 688 N.Y.S.2d 413 (1999), where the
"defendants in this action had a full and fair opportunity to litigate this issue."
Ricketts, 181 Misc. 2d at 841, 688 N.Y.S.2d at 421.
2 Id. at
3 U.S.
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constitutional right to liberty.8 The fourth cause of action "[was]
directed against Local Law 83 (1997) 9 imposing a moratorium on
the granting of new applications."'0 Plaintiffs moved for summary
judgment on the third and fourth causes of action and the
defendants cross-moved for partial summary judgment on all four
causes of action.'
The Supreme Court, New York County,
concluded that due process was satisfied, the Local Law 115
provision dealing with applications was invalid, and the plaintiffs
were not deprived of their constitutional right to liberty because of
the lack of permanency of the grandfather authorizations. 2
The plaintiffs comprised "operators of existing commuter
services who ha[d] been denied their requests to expand operations
or [were] seeking to obtain authorization for a new commuter van
service and the organization representing the interests of commuter
van operators."' 3 They objected that the City of New York had
control over granting franchises for commuter van services.1 4
Within the four causes of action, several New York State
constitutional issues were raised."
The lower court stated, "[a] local law is clothed with the
presumption of constitutionality," however, it "may not be
arbitrary."' 16 It was the responsibility of the City Government to
8Id.

The third cause of action clams" that this [law] which does not provide
for the permanent authorizations accorded by the State to existing commuter
van services is ... invalid as inconsistent with State law and deprives the
owners ... of their constitutional right to liberty by depriving them of the
right to earn a living." Id.
9 Local Law 83 of 1997 provides in pertinent part: "a local law.., in
relation to imposing a moratorium on the acceptance, processing and approval
of application for authorization to operate or expand the operation of
commuter van services." Id.
'0 Id. The Local Law 83 (1997) under the fourth cause of action expired and
was not renewed.
"Id. at 840, 688 N.Y.S.2d at 420.
12 Id. at 841, 688 N.Y.S.2d. at 421.
13 Id. at 840, 688 N.Y.S.2d at 420.
14

Id.

15Id.
16

Id. at 841, 688 N.Y.S.2d at 421. The court noted that:
[tihe exceedingly strong presumption of constitutionality
applies not only to enactments of the legislature but to
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regulate traffic on the public streets, and under of Local Law 115,
the City had the power to regulate van service travel routes.1 7 In
this case, the power granted to the City could be related to its
responsibility to regulate traffic. 8 The lower court analyzed the
holding of the Court of Appeals in Bakery Salvage Corporationv.
City of Lackawanna.9 In Bakery Salvage the court dealt with an
ordinance that restricted certain size trucks from using a residential
street.2" The plaintiffs brought action challenging the ordinance,
but the court found the ordinance valid, stating that there was no
doubt that the city had the power to enact a reasonable ordinance to
regulate the weight and size of vehicles on city streets.2 ' The court
in Bakery Salvage explained that the plaintiffs' claims could not
"override the safety of residents and the reasonable regulations of a
city designed to promote the public safety."'
In the current case, the lower court did not conclude that the
permanent status of the franchises under State control violated
State law. The lower court also reasoned that it was clear that the
State intended the City to have "its own licensing policy
4
undisturbed by the prior licensing policy of the State."
The court
Therefore, the plaintiffs' argument was flawed.
disagreed with the plaintiffs' contention that there was an

ordinances of municipalities as well. While this presumption
is rebuttable, unconstitutionality must be demonstrated
beyond a reasonable doubt and only as a last resort should
courts strike down legislation on the ground of
unconstitutionality.
Id.

17 Id.

11 Id.at 842, 688 N.Y.S.2d at 421-22.

19 24 N.Y.2d 643, 249 N.E.2d 438, 301 N.Y.S.2d 581 (1969).
20 Id. at 645, 249 N.E.2d at 438, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 582.
21 Id. at 644, 645, 249 N.E.2d at 438, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 581, 582.
21 Id. at 646, 249 N.E.2d at 439, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 583.
23 Ricketts, 181 Misc. 2d at 842, 688 N.Y.S.2d at 422.
24
Id.at 843, 688 N.Y.S.2d at 422. "It is obvious that this legislation permits
the City of New York to limit the previous permanent licenses to operate that
were granted by the State. This was the understanding of the State legislators
most directly involved in the enactment of the legislation." Id.
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unconstitutional taking of property and a denial of their right to
earn a living.'
The court also relied on People v. Cook 6 in reaching its
conclusion that the power to regulate or prohibit a business did not
violate the due process clause because "[t]he right to do business
has never been considered a fundamental right."27 The court in
Cook explained that New York City had the "power to regulate
retail prices of cigarettes" and it could require a price difference
between cigarettes with high tar and nicotine and those with low
tar and nicotine.2" The appellant in Cook argued, among other
things, that this price difference was unconstitutional because it
"violate[d] the constitutional guarantee of due process because its
pricing requirements [were] too vague."2' 9 The court held the
reason for the price differential was health promotion, and New
York City was "granted the exercise of police power to promote
health by the sovereign people acting through the State
Constitution and the State Legislature."3'
Additionally, the court in the instant case addressed the specific
issue of whether Local Law 115 could exist without the "call back
provision" and whether it was intended to exist if not all the
provisions were considered valid.3 Stating that this issue has to be
looked at on a case by case basis, the court applied the principle in
Mayor of the City of New York v. Council of the City of New
York 32 Here, Local Law 13 was considered invalid because a
portion of it had given defendant Council the ability to share
2 Id. "[T ]he plaintiffs' licenses to operate their franchises do not constitute a
property right protected by the Siate and Federal constitutions; nor do their
businesses fall under the liberty clauses of those constitutions." Id.
26 34 N.Y.2d 100, 312 N.E.2d 452, 356 N.Y.S.2d 259 (1974). The primary
issue in this case was "whether New York City has the power to regulate
retail prices of cigarettes so as to require retailers to maintain a difference in
price between brands that have a higher tar and nicotine content." Id. at 103,
312 N.E.2d at 454, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 262.
' Ricketts, 181 Misc. 2d at 843, 688 N.Y.S.2d at 422.
28 Cook, 34 N.Y.2d at 103, 312 N.E.2d at 454, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 262.
29
1d. at 104, 312 N.E.2d at 454, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 262.
30Id. at 105, 312 N.E.2d at 455, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 263.
31 Ricketts, 181 Misc. 2d at 844, 688 N.Y.S.2d at 423.
32

235 A.D.2d 230, 651 N.Y.S.2d 531 (1997).
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statutory executive power with the Mayor, resulting in the Mayor's
powers being limited.33 The court found that the Mayor should not
be forced to share statutory power and declared the entire law
invalid, rather than severing the specific portion.' The court did
not find that the defendant intended to have the law enforced if part
of it was removed, and it was intended to exist with all the
provisions. 35 Likewise, in Ricketts, if the invalid provisions of a
statute were "incidental to the main purpose of the statute," then
they can be removed without affecting the rest of the statute. 6 The
Ricketts court concluded that the invalid provision was incidental
to the main purpose of Local Law 115, which gave city authorities
the control over the approval and regulation of commuter van
services.37
Furthermore, the court disagreed with the section in Local Law
115 which declared the automatic denial of a licensee after the
passing of 180 days without giving a reason.3" The court noted that
it was only fair, as well as essential for due process, that licensees
receive notice of a denial, be given a reason for it, and also be
given an opportunity to present their case.39 The court cited
Taddonio v. Heckler, which stated that the defendant's procedure
in terminating plaintiffs supplemental security income benefits did
not violate due process.4 In Taddonio, the court found that it was
important to give the plaintiff adequate process before his benefits
were terminated and due process required this in order to be sure
33id.

34 Id. at 231, 651 N.Y.S.2d at 532.
3 Id.

36 Ricketts, 181 Misc. 2d at 844, 688 N.Y.S.2d at 423. "The City Council has
vigorously opposed invalidation of the statute even if the challenged portions
of Local Law 115 were declared unconstitutional." Id. at 845, 688 N.Y.S.2d
at 423.
37
38

39

Id.

Id.

Id. at 845, 688 N.Y.S.2d at 423-24.

609 F. Supp. 689 (E.D.Pa. 1985). In Taddonio, the plaintiff "argues that
the termination of his Supplemental Security Income benefits for non-medical
reasons prior to a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge violated his"
due process rights. Id at 690.
41 Id. at 694.
4
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that the individual was given an opportunity to present his
case. 42Likewise, the Ricketts court remanded the case "to the City
defendants in order that the Taxi and Limousine Commission may
adjudicate the plaintiffs' individual claims. '' 43
In sum, the Constitution of the State of New York' parallels that
of the Federal Constitution 5 with respect to due process. When
analyzing due process requirements in regard to licensees receiving
notice and reason for denial, as well as an opportunity to present
their case, the due process rights guaranteed under the United
States
and
New
York
Constitutions
are
virtually
indistinguishable.'
Kathleen Byrne

42id.
43

Ricketts, 181 Misc. 2d at 846, 688 N.Y.S.2d at 424.
CONST. art. 1, § 6. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
45 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See supranote 3 and accompanying text.
46 Ricketts,
181 Misc. 2d at 845, 688 N.Y.S.2d at 423-24.
4N.Y.
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